Thursday, April 5, 2012

Trading Master Limited Partnerships

This is an excerpt from an article written for Active Trader Magazine March 2012 Issue

Introduction to Master Limited Partnerships


Diversification, high income, tax efficiency, lack of correlation to traditional asset classes; these four elements would seem to be the pillar of every well designed investment vehicle. Master Limited Partnerships (MLP) have delivered just that for the last decade.  But what is exactly an MLP? They are publicly traded, limited partnerships which own and operate gas and oil pipelines, storage terminals and refineries.  They are structured like partnerships to take advantage of favorable taxation and to create income focused investment vehicles.

MLP have over the years concentrated in sectors related to energy but unlike their earlier versions of the 1980s which were structured solely for the purpose of exploiting tax loopholes in the oil and drilling area, these new partnerships have become efficient and dynamic utilities. They have acquired cheap assets with predictable cash-flows like pipelines and terminals and became very good at operating them. 

These investment vehicles retain only a mild correlation to the price of oil and gas since they care mainly for its transportation. However, as the economy grows and demand for energy grows with it, the profits of the MLP increase accordingly.  MLP also offer protection against inflation in two ways: via their portfolio of real assets and via “inflation-plus pricing,” or in other words their ability to price their services and products at a premium of the PPI rate.

Due to the partnership structure, MLP generally do not pay income taxes eliminating the problem of double taxation of dividends that corporate investors face.  MLP generally pay out all available cash flow defined as cash flow from operations less maintenance capital expenditures in the form of quarterly distributions.  Additionally, limited partnerships receive a tax shield equivalent to 80-90% of their cash distributions every year.  This allows an investor to pay income taxes only on 10% to 20% of the distribution received.  The rest is deferred until the investor sells the security. This tax deferral reduces the investor’s tax basis in the partnership unit. Because of these reasons, MLP seem perfect for estate planning.

There are different risks associated with this type of investment.  The first would seem to be the competition MLP face from other fixed income products.  As interest rates in general increase, so must the rate of MLP’s distributions, otherwise a price correction will occur. Generally MLP are priced to yield anywhere between 6% and 10% depending on the level of risk associated with each utility.  Accordingly to Wachovia Securities research, movements in interest rates explain approximately 25-30% of MLP price changes.

Additionally, like in every company, macro-economic performance and management execution are important elements in the valuation process; therefore distributions could vary depending on such factors. 

While one of the main elements of attraction is the tax efficiency enjoyed by the MLP, such advantage could be erased by a hostile Congress.

MLP may have some restrictions for IRA accounts.  While they can be held in such accounts, MLP should not generate more than $1,000 per year in UBTI (Unrelated Business Taxable Income) or the exceeding income would be subject to taxation.


Trading Master Limited Partnerships


MLP are usually considered long term investments generally included in an income oriented portfolio. Their large distribution and the consistency of growth of such pay-outs made the sector a staple of passively managed portfolios.  However, the combination of today’s low rates of returns for most asset classes, MLP consistent total return outperformance and an increase in the sector volatility should make them interesting for more active investors as well.

Master Limited Partnerships (and we focus on energy related names which comprise the large majority of this universe) are divided in 10 subsectors which cover the whole spectrum of the energy chain – upstream, midstream, downstream – with a concentration of companies in the midstream sector (transportation, storage, refinery). 

There are different indexes that allow monitoring of the performance of the sector in aggregate but the two main benchmarks are the Alerian MLP Index which is made of 50 MLP and it is cap weighted and the Cushion 30 which includes 30 MLP and it is equally weighted.  It is important to note that in the Alerian Index, the five largest companies represent over 40% of the index.

MLP have provided an annualized total return of approximately 20% in the last decade (there are small differences depending on the Index used) and even when expanding the historical analysis to a longer time horizon, the total return does not vary much.  A large portion of this performance clearly comes from distributions which have averaged anywhere between 6% to over 7% depending on the benchmark.  The current distribution level, its expected rate of growth and how it compares to alternative income sources is a traditional way to determine value in the sector and trigger trades.  Classic comparisons are run against the US Treasury 10 year note, REITs and BBB bonds. The average spread over the 10 year Treasuries is at 321 basis points and we are today at a 413 point spread (this is based on the Cushion 30 Index, when looking at the Alerian Index the spread seems to be a little lower than 400 points).  Spreads over other income products are also above their historical norm as of this writing; the average spread over REITs is approximately 190 basis points and we are now trading at 241.  The spread over BBB bonds is on average at 129 basis points and it is now at 162.  Spreads over 400 basis points versus Treasuries have consistently shown a positive forward returns for MLPs. Normally this metric tends not to exceed 500 basis points but it did experience an aberration of 1200 points during the 2008 credit crisis climax.  Spreads at around 200 basis points are generally precursor of underperformance.

Another valuation metric typically used for MLPs is Current Price over Distributable Cash-flow; such metric now stands at 11.6 times which is line with historical fair value (source: Swank Capital)

As mentioned in the introduction, another useful trait for this sector is the lack of correlation to stocks and a mild correlation to energy prices.  Correlation to stocks did increase during the 2008 crisis as the result of most asset classes increasing correlations and because the core of the crisis generated from the credit market which is vital to this sector.  As far as correlation to oil and gas, the degree varies depending on the subsectors but overall there is more correlation to GDP than to spot crude.  The following table shows individual correlation to oil and gas for some of the most common names:


APU
BPL
EEP
EPD
FGP
KMP
MMP
NRGY
NS
PAA
SPH
SXL
TCP
NAT GAS
CRUDE
APU
1














BPL
0.404
1













EEP
0.449
0.444
1












EPD
0.42
0.296
0.4
1











FGP
0.48
0.315
0.332
0.387
1










KMP
0.487
0.373
0.493
0.383
0.264
1









MMP
0.376
0.422
0.5
0.371
0.241
0.425
1








NRGY
0.38
0.508
0.54
0.367
0.323
0.324
0.603
1







NS
0.374
0.524
0.471
0.373
0.227
0.371
0.615
0.675
1






PAA
0.414
0.289
0.445
0.384
0.273
0.286
0.44
0.475
0.43
1





SPH
0.617
0.256
0.462
0.473
0.416
0.434
0.466
0.502
0.516
0.4
1




SXL
0.344
0.427
0.409
0.273
0.164
0.295
0.505
0.555
0.544
0.357
0.432
1



TCP
0.431
0.256
0.465
0.413
0.351
0.229
0.291
0.35
0.361
0.27
0.448
0.251
1


NAT GAS
0.068
-0.06
0.069
0.116
-0.015
0.186
-0.002
0.038
0.039
0.031
0.087
0.031
-0.013
1

CRUDE
0.061
0.105
0.234
0.172
0.154
0.059
0.013
0.093
0.014
0.057
0.002
0.01
0.2266
0.24262
1

As indicated previously, MLP in aggregate also show mild correlation to other asset classes at 0.49 versus the SP500 and 0.35 versus REITS (Source: Swank Capital).  One caveat, correlations can change and depend largely on the time period chosen.

It is also important to remember that while most analysis is generalized by looking at aggregate numbers, the MLP universe, as I mentioned earlier, is represented by 10 different subsectors which may show significant delta in their performance. Trading opportunities surface regularly by evaluating subsectors against each other. As an example, last year the best subsector was General Managers while the worst one was Natural Gas Storage; the performance delta was a significant 60%.  The following is a list of the available subsectors:

-         General Managers
-         Natural Gas Gatherers and Processors
-         Refined Products Pipelines and Terminals
-         Natural Gas Transportation
-         Crude Oil Transportation,
-         Upstream
-         Shipping
-         Coal
-         Propane
-         Natural Gas Storage

As investors’ interest in the space has grown over the last few years, more investment vehicles have also come to market.  While it is usually a much better trading proposition to utilize individual MLP (unless there is a need to avoid the additional tax reporting complication of a K-1), some Closed-End funds may offer arbitrage opportunities.  Closed End funds can trade at a premium or discount to NAV and can therefore provide additional opportunities to extract value.

Conclusion

There are many fundamental factors that will increase active investors’ interest in the MLP space.  The sector has now a market cap of $325 billions and it is estimated that another $250 billions will be needed by 2035 just to service and distribute the existing energy reserves.  The evolution of the natural gas story after the large reserve discoveries in the United States will offer many opportunities in the future. Additionally, Merger and Acquisition activity should continue to provide arbitrageurs opportunities to participate in the consolidation trend.

Enough to keep everyone interested!  

PS Tables calculations provided by Rosario Rivadeneyra


Disclaimer: PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. THEREFORE, NO CURRENT OR PROSPECTIVE CLIENT SHOULD ASSUME THAT FUTURE PERFORMANCE OF ANY SPECIFIC INVESTMENT AND/OR INVESTMENT STRATEGIES MADE REFERENCE TO ABOVE AND RECOMMENDED OR UNDERTAKEN BY CERVINO CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, WILL BE PROFITABLE OR EQUAL THE CORRESPONDING INDICATED PERFORMANCE LEVELS. DIFFERENT TYPES OF INVESTMENTS INVOLVE VARYING DEGREES OF RISK, AND THERE CAN BE NO ASSURANCE THAT ANY SPECIFIC INVESTMENT WILL EITHER BE SUITABLE OR PROFITABLE FOR A CLIENT OR PROSPECTIVE CLIENT'S INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO. HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS FOR INVESTMENT INDICES AND/OR PORTFOLIO BENCHMARKS DO NOT REFLECT THE DEDUCTION OF TRANSACTION AND/OR CUSTODIAL CHARGES, THE DEDUCTION OF ADVISORY MANAGEMENT FEES, NOR THE IMPACT OF TAXES, THE INCURRENCE OF WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DECREASING HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS.
HYPOTHETICAL RISK DISCLOSURE: HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS HAVE MANY INHERENT LIMITATIONS, SOME OF WHICH ARE DESCRIBED BELOW. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE THAT ANY ACCOUNT WILL OR IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE PROFITS OR LOSSES SIMILAR TO THOSE SHOWN, IN FACT, THERE ARE FREQUENTLY SHARP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND THE ACTUAL RESULTS SUBSEQUENTLY ACHIEVED BY ANY TRADING PROGRAM. ONE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS IS THAT THEY ARE GENERALLY PREPARED WITH THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT. IN ADDITION, HYPOTHETICAL TRADING DOES NOT INVOLVE FINANCIAL RISK, AND NO HYPOTHETICAL TRADING RECORD CAN COMPLETELY ACCOUNT FOR THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL RISK IN ACTUAL TRADING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ABILITY TO WITHSTAND LOSSES OR ADHERE TO A PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM IN SPITE OF TRADING LOSSES ARE MATERIAL POINTS WHICH CAN ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS. THERE ARE NUMEROUS OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO THE MARKETS IN GENERAL OR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY SPECIFIC TRADING PROGRAM WHICH CANNOT BE FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE PREPARATION OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ALL OF WHICH CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS.


Friday, February 3, 2012

Gold: A Solution for Zero-Beta Satellites

In a previous piece, I illustrated a more active approach to core-satellite portfolio construction. While managing the core in a pro-active way mostly deals with fine tuning a multi-beta exposure and then applying active risk management, more creativity can be utilized for the satellite.

In this regard, there are probably two main approaches: active alpha or crisis alpha.  The first would require a strategy geared toward exploiting market anomalies that may lead to superior performance; such outperformance may realize itself via concentrated and targeted bets or via uncorrelated performance when measured over a certain timeframe. On the other hand, the latter would implement a strategy not only generally uncorrelated to the traditional core but that would be able to produce superior performance especially during times of great stress for traditional asset classes. 

This is an important distinction often overlooked: alternative investments which are usually generalized as a solution for alpha exposure may provide superior performance (especially over longer time frames) but not necessarily at times of significant liquidity and credit breakdowns for traditional asset classes.  A detailed factor analysis may uncover superior returns for many alternative strategies; however, it may also reveal a degree of sensitivity to fundamental price drivers common to traditional assets which may be much higher than desired.  Only a few strategies seem to be providers of crisis alpha or outperformance in time of significant stress in traditional betas: gold seem to fit that definition.

The successful run of the precious metal in the last ten years has been sparked by a confluence of positive factors such as extremely easy global monetary policy and a socio-economic transition from an age of optimism to a zero-sum era.  These elements reversed a downward trend in gold entrenched since the famous top in the early 1980s.  Central banks have been reversing their selling course as well as they relaxed their monetary policy.

This new dynamic rendered gold a stronger candidate for portfolio allocation.  Gold ability to provide crisis alpha makes it a perfect asset for inclusion in a zero-beta satellite.
Gold does not produce a stream of cash-flows which makes it difficult to analyze it based on classic valuation metrics such as DCF models, leaving most of the analytical work reliant on the study of supply and demand.  However, as the metal increases its magnetism for investment flows, its continued lack of correlation to traditional asset classes becomes the ultimate analytical input.

The World Gold Council ran a number of interesting statistics and scenarios in a recent working paper[1] showing how gold has been a consistent risk diversifier in addition to its traditional role as a store of wealth.

Their analysis showed that a 3.3% to a 7.5% allocation to gold (depending on the composition of the portfolio and the investor currency of reference) can improve the risk adjusted profile of the allocation even when other alternative assets are included.

In one of the tables produced by the study, we can see two different portfolios, a standard one allocated 55% equities, 25% fixed income, 5% cash and 15% alternative investments, and a conservative version allocated 30% equities, 50% fixed income, 10% cash and 10% alternative assets.  The portfolios were tested for the trading period from January 1987 to June 2011 utilizing US Dollar denominated assets.  In all cases portfolios with gold included scored higher Information Ratios with an optimal allocation to gold between 3.3% and 4.4%.

In this new turbulent investing environment, it is my belief that the old approach of trading around the mean hoping that investment returns will conform to an unrealistic bell curve will continue to disappoint and a more aggressive approach toward hedging and/or exploiting tail risk will continue to be key for some time.

Got gold?


Disclaimer: PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. THEREFORE, NO CURRENT OR PROSPECTIVE CLIENT SHOULD ASSUME THAT FUTURE PERFORMANCE OF ANY SPECIFIC INVESTMENT AND/OR INVESTMENT STRATEGIES MADE REFERENCE TO ABOVE AND RECOMMENDED OR UNDERTAKEN BY CERVINO CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, WILL BE PROFITABLE OR EQUAL THE CORRESPONDING INDICATED PERFORMANCE LEVELS. DIFFERENT TYPES OF INVESTMENTS INVOLVE VARYING DEGREES OF RISK, AND THERE CAN BE NO ASSURANCE THAT ANY SPECIFIC INVESTMENT WILL EITHER BE SUITABLE OR PROFITABLE FOR A CLIENT OR PROSPECTIVE CLIENT'S INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO. HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS FOR INVESTMENT INDICES AND/OR PORTFOLIO BENCHMARKS DO NOT REFLECT THE DEDUCTION OF TRANSACTION AND/OR CUSTODIAL CHARGES, THE DEDUCTION OF ADVISORY MANAGEMENT FEES, NOR THE IMPACT OF TAXES, THE INCURRENCE OF WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DECREASING HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS.
HYPOTHETICAL RISK DISCLOSURE: HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS HAVE MANY INHERENT LIMITATIONS, SOME OF WHICH ARE DESCRIBED BELOW. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE THAT ANY ACCOUNT WILL OR IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE PROFITS OR LOSSES SIMILAR TO THOSE SHOWN, IN FACT, THERE ARE FREQUENTLY SHARP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND THE ACTUAL RESULTS SUBSEQUENTLY ACHIEVED BY ANY TRADING PROGRAM. ONE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS IS THAT THEY ARE GENERALLY PREPARED WITH THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT. IN ADDITION, HYPOTHETICAL TRADING DOES NOT INVOLVE FINANCIAL RISK, AND NO HYPOTHETICAL TRADING RECORD CAN COMPLETELY ACCOUNT FOR THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL RISK IN ACTUAL TRADING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ABILITY TO WITHSTAND LOSSES OR ADHERE TO A PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM IN SPITE OF TRADING LOSSES ARE MATERIAL POINTS WHICH CAN ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS. THERE ARE NUMEROUS OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO THE MARKETS IN GENERAL OR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY SPECIFIC TRADING PROGRAM WHICH CANNOT BE FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE PREPARATION OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ALL OF WHICH CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS.


[1] World Gold Council, Gold: Alternative Investment, Foundation Asset, October 2011

Thursday, December 29, 2011

Excerpts From Cervino Capital Management 2012 Market Outlook

12/28/2011
The business of forecasting is often a foolish endeavor; financial author and “enfant terrible” Nassim Taleb called the process of financial divining being “fooled by randomness” in his book by the same title.  And yet every year, most financial participants will spend thousands of words dispensing their prognostications about the following 12 months.  Admittedly, I am afflicted by the same disease, although my discretionary approach to investing and trading allows me for a convenient degree of flexibility in changing my positions when it becomes apparent that the assumptions of the original prediction were unfortunately wrong.
This year the dynamic of forecasting seems even more foolish than ever; the European crisis remains largely unresolved and still centerpiece to every future macroeconomic development.  The first quarter in 2012 will see $850 billions of debt to be rolled over and 1/3 of that amount just from Italy.  Should the market continue to keep interest rates above 7% for Italian debt, the pressure on the ECB to intervene in dramatic fashion will probably prove unstoppable.  Any large scale intervention by the ECB should calm markets and ignite a new leg up in gold.  A refusal of the ECB to bend to market and political pressures might prove highly deflationary and possibly result in a reformation of the Euro currency.
The development of the Euro crisis influences all markets with the results of increasing correlations across the board.  The Euro should remain weak but volatile as every time a positive piece of news is leaked by Brussels, Paris or Frankfurt, short covering rallies will continue to occur in swift manner.  Equities all over the world will also remain hostage to Europe.  European stocks seem cheaper than US equities but much closer to the epicenter of the crisis.  US stocks are not tremendously expensive but, in a world of higher correlations, still exposed to a dire recession in Europe and a now manifest slow-down in emerging economies.  The level of EPS for US stocks is also worrying as they seem to be at the top of a positive earning cycle.  One of the faults of fundamental analysis is that things always look best at the top.  However, all considered, US equities might be the default choice for 2012 as they are in a stronger position than European and Emerging Markets equities, more attractive than most fixed income instruments and probably less volatile than I expect commodities to be in the new year.
On the subject of commodities, I expect increased volatility as the result of a few factors: Europe, uncertain Middle East developments after the Arab Spring of 2011 and the MF Global fiasco.  The alleged criminal actions that took place at MF Global leading to its demise and the fumbled handling of the situation by most parties involved, especially the CFTC and the CME, have resulted in a negative structural issue with the commodities market.  The Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the largest commodity market in the world, has seen its trading volume cut by 10% since the MFG bankruptcy.  Part of this decrease is due to some trading funds still frozen at MFG but also to hedgers and speculators looking for alternatives to the futures market.  This is a very negative development as a healthy and efficient financial system needs a healthy, secure and transparent hedging market like futures.
I also expect Master Limited Partnerships (energy infrastructures) to continue to do well and outperform most sectors.  My long term play on natural gas and water remains, in my view, a centerpiece of any long term portfolios.
In conclusion, I will be expecting high levels of volatility in the first quarter of 2012 as we work through the European crisis; I will be monitoring closely the political debate in Europe and the actions (not the words) of the ECB.  Technically, I will also keep an eye to the correlations between the Euro banking sector and gold to spot potential turns in this saga.  Should I see the ECB become more aggressive in its own quantitative easing program, I shall expect gold to once again outperform.    On the equity side, I expect Master Limited Partnerships to remain a favorite buy on most dips.
One last element not to be forgotten is the US presidential election in November.  While not as pivotal as other past elections, the rhetoric of the political debate might turn nasty and prove destabilizing.  However, election years tend to be generally kind to the market as short term policies are hastily put in place to keep the incumbent president on the job.
One thing is for sure…we will not be bored!

Disclaimer: PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. THEREFORE, NO CURRENT OR PROSPECTIVE CLIENT SHOULD ASSUME THAT FUTURE PERFORMANCE OF ANY SPECIFIC INVESTMENT AND/OR INVESTMENT STRATEGIES MADE REFERENCE TO ABOVE AND RECOMMENDED OR UNDERTAKEN BY CERVINO CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, WILL BE PROFITABLE OR EQUAL THE CORRESPONDING INDICATED PERFORMANCE LEVELS. DIFFERENT TYPES OF INVESTMENTS INVOLVE VARYING DEGREES OF RISK, AND THERE CAN BE NO ASSURANCE THAT ANY SPECIFIC INVESTMENT WILL EITHER BE SUITABLE OR PROFITABLE FOR A CLIENT OR PROSPECTIVE CLIENT'S INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO. HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS FOR INVESTMENT INDICES AND/OR PORTFOLIO BENCHMARKS DO NOT REFLECT THE DEDUCTION OF TRANSACTION AND/OR CUSTODIAL CHARGES, THE DEDUCTION OF ADVISORY MANAGEMENT FEES, NOR THE IMPACT OF TAXES, THE INCURRENCE OF WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DECREASING HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS.
HYPOTHETICAL RISK DISCLOSURE: HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS HAVE MANY INHERENT LIMITATIONS, SOME OF WHICH ARE DESCRIBED BELOW. NO REPRESENTATION IS BEING MADE THAT ANY ACCOUNT WILL OR IS LIKELY TO ACHIEVE PROFITS OR LOSSES SIMILAR TO THOSE SHOWN, IN FACT, THERE ARE FREQUENTLY SHARP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND THE ACTUAL RESULTS SUBSEQUENTLY ACHIEVED BY ANY TRADING PROGRAM. ONE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS IS THAT THEY ARE GENERALLY PREPARED WITH THE BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT. IN ADDITION, HYPOTHETICAL TRADING DOES NOT INVOLVE FINANCIAL RISK, AND NO HYPOTHETICAL TRADING RECORD CAN COMPLETELY ACCOUNT FOR THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL RISK IN ACTUAL TRADING. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ABILITY TO WITHSTAND LOSSES OR ADHERE TO A PARTICULAR TRADING PROGRAM IN SPITE OF TRADING LOSSES ARE MATERIAL POINTS WHICH CAN ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS. THERE ARE NUMEROUS OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO THE MARKETS IN GENERAL OR TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY SPECIFIC TRADING PROGRAM WHICH CANNOT BE FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE PREPARATION OF HYPOTHETICAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS AND ALL OF WHICH CAN ADVERSELY AFFECT ACTUAL TRADING RESULTS.

Wednesday, November 30, 2011

The Importance of Market Structure

In my investment classes, I always stress to my students the importance of analyzing markets and building portfolios through four lenses:
-         fundamentals (relative valuation metrics, earnings cycles, macroeconomics, etc.)
-         technicals (support/resistance levels, moving averages, breadth, etc.)
-         sentiment (volatility measures, put and call ratios, CDS, etc.)
and…..
-         market structure.

The latter element is, in my view, the most important albeit the most difficult to research and forecast.  Market structure is that comprehensive box that relates to the rules of engagement for all market participants. 

Structure refers to the regulatory framework such as what behavior legislators and regulators may want to push forward but it also refers to the much more ethereal aspect of how such rules will be enforced and potentially “bent” in favor of certain investing classes. 

To this point, think of High Frequency Trading (HFT) and how the combination of technology interests and for-profit exchanges lead to large structural changes in the markets with numerous distortions in the way the constant price discovery process now works. HFT is not the only example in recent history; the introduction of commodity related Exchange Traded Funds lead to behavioral changes in the commodity markets due to the injection of a persistent long bias with retail characteristics in a traditionally institutional hedging market.

Historically we also witnessed other major structural changes that lead to long bullish waves such as rules in favors of equity investments as commonplace vehicles for retirement savings.

Understanding market structure will also force investors to research how the bigger players will align in the financial spectrum; this goes beyond following the smart money such as hedge fund managers and corporate raiders but more and more it has to do with fully understanding global politics and power plays.  Today’s investor should spend more time analyzing Central Bankers speeches and Heads of States political realities rather than pouring over balance sheets and income statements.

The real truth is that the “1% of the 1%” sets the rules of engagement and while most investors do not have a seat at that very exclusive table, in order to be successful at the investing game you must work through an analytical framework that will take you as close as possible.  One of the most significant realities of the unraveling of our financial markets since 2008 is that the rules of engagements are constantly being rewritten putting any investor in a more complex situation than ever before.  Structure is key but it is also now a fast moving target.  I believe that to a large extent this is one reason why traditional portfolio management approaches have failed miserably in this decade; as market structure became more negotiable and more unstable, it also became even more important yet more difficult to predict with the end result of undermining strategies established under the assumption of structural stability.

Successful investing in the next decade will require active political analysis and possibly an increased level of stakeholder’s activism in an attempt to be part of the rule making process.  Intense strategic geo-political analysis should also play part in the construction of every portfolio.  Legal expertise, now the domain of M&A and Distressed Securities traders, will probably become required talent for most money managers.

In conclusion, the world has become a lot more complex and unpredictable; successful investors will rise to the challenge by shedding old habits and stale formulas and embracing three-dimensional active analysis.

Tuesday, November 15, 2011

Are Financial Markets Doomed? MF Global Bankruptcy Strikes at the Core of Markets

Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. LeoTolstoy, Anna Karenina, Chapter 1

In a bull market everyone is happy, the sky is the limit and we all feel like “wunderkinds”.  We see cracks but we disregard them as insignificant, we may notice incompetence and malice but the show must go on.

Then the inevitable moment of reckoning occurs, bull times turn into bears and the sky is suddenly not limitless but heavy and suffocating.  Disasters like the Lehman moment in 2008 happen and great destruction touches society at its core.  The only silver lining, you may think, is that something must be learned and that things can only get better from here.

Fast forward to the fall of 2011 and “enjoy” the MF Global moment.  The bankruptcy of this once powerful derivative broker may not have, so far, scared markets as much as Lehman but to the eyes of the careful analyst it is actually much more dangerous and systemically insidious.

MF Global had been around for more than 200 years facilitating commodity trading around the world; in some exchanges up to 80% of the volume was attributed to MF Global. This changed recently when disgraced ex New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine was chosen to run the firm.  Eighteen months later, MF Global is bankrupt thanks to a series of actions that make Lehman look like child’s play. 

Corzine levered up the firms’ capital to a ratio as high as 40 to 1 in risky bets on European sovereign debt.  Sounds like 2008 all over again? Weren’t we going to fix the leverage issue with banks? I guess not.  Corzine also levered his political capital to intimidate regulators in order to have rules changed or kept in his favor.  Doesn’t it sound very familiar again? But additionally, the MF saga really strikes a deadly blow to financial markets: while no formal indictments have been put forward yet, it is clear that $600 million of customer segregated funds have been lost, stolen, vaporized (you pick your favorite).  In commodity trading, customer funds are fully segregated from the bank capital to ensure safety in cases like bankruptcy.  It is the cornerstone of the brokerage industry.  The CFTC, the commodity regulatory body, is supposed to oversee this process and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (the largest derivative exchange in the US) is responsible for managing this process as well.

Almost three weeks after the filing of MF Global bankruptcy, customers of the bank still have their accounts frozen (only open positions were transferred to new brokers with a percentage of minimum margin needed to hold the exposure) and there are questions whether they will recover 100% of their funds. 

Even though customers are not part of the bankruptcy dynamic since their funds are outside of the bank’s balance sheet, the Trustee in charge of the process is holding everyone hostage.

If our financial markets cannot guarantee safety of funds deposited with brokers or banks, our economic system will fall into a dark medieval state that will impoverish all.  Liquidity will dry up, spreads will widen, prices and volatility will become intolerable.  While it is clear that the system of incentives in Wall Street continues to push at best risky behavior and at worst illegal activities, our regulators and legal system continue to abdicate their responsibilities.

This is very serious as people’s faith in financial markets cannot be broken once again.

Monday, October 17, 2011

Behavioral Investing

Take a look at the newly posted book review of James Montier book on behavioral investing..a few ideas form his book:

"....Montier also touches on the subject of bubbles in asset prices; how to define them and spot them and why they arise.  Along this subject, he writes about a series of behavioral tendencies that mark the human process when it comes to investing:
-          over-optimism which blinds us from the dangers posed by predictable surprises
-          illusion of control or the belief that we can influence the outcome of uncontrollable events
-          self-serving bias or the innate tendency to overweight information that validate our bias
-          inattentional blindness or the fact that we do not expect to see what we are not looking for....."

Read the whole review on the Book Review page